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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw1 Lord Reid in the House of Lords said this:2 
 
‘It would seem obvious in principle that a pursuer or plaintiff must prove 
not only negligence or breach of duty but also that such fault caused or 
materially contributed to his injury, and there is ample authority for that 
proposition both in Scotland and in England.’ 
 
This rule was applicable to cases of breach of statutory duty as well as negligence 
and the matter had to be proved on the balance of probabilities.  The reference to 
                                           
1 [1956] AC 613.     
2 At 620. 
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the concept of a ‘material contribution’ has led to great difficulty in English law, 
although not for quite a time after the decision in Bonnington Castings itself.  The 
difficulties have arisen most commonly in practice in cases concerning clinical 
negligence or industrial diseases, although they are not confined to those classes 
of case.  The main issues include the following: Is there on the authorities, as a 
matter of binding precedent, a ‘material contribution rule’ separate and distinct 
from the normal rule in negligence that the claimant must prove as one of the 
elements of the cause of action that the defendant’s wrong was a but-for cause of 
the claimant’s damage?; if there is such a rule, what is its justification and what 
are the parameters?; might there be a number of distinct ‘material contribution’ 
rules?3 The Court of Appeal in Bailey v Ministry of Defence4 stated that there was 
indeed a ‘material contribution rule’ that operated as a ‘modification’ to the 
requirement to prove but-for causation.  This was then accepted as good law in a 
number of cases, mostly in the context of clinical negligence or industrial disease, 
although actually applied in only a few.5  The status of Bailey was reviewed by the 
Privy Council in Williams v The Bermuda Hospitals Board.6  It was hoped that this 
decision would bring some clarity to the status of ‘material contribution’ in English 
law; lawyers arguing in the interests of defendants hoped, furthermore, that 
either it would be held that there was no ‘material contribution’ exception to the 
requirement to prove but-for causation or that any such exception would be 
defined narrowly.7  It is the purpose of the present paper to consider the 
authorities on this matter in the light of the decision in Williams and subsequent 
case law 
                                           
3 These issues are considered in a number of recent monographs on causation in tort: S 
Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) pp 239-248; S Green, 
Causation in Negligence (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2015) Ch 5; G 
Turton, Evidential Uncertainty in Causation in Negligence (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2016), pp 66-79. 
4 [2008] EWCA Civ 883, [2009] 1 WLR 1052. 
5 See below nn 72-80. 
6 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888. 
7 The NHS Litigation Authority entered submissions as interveners in Williams, 
notwithstanding the case’s origins in Bermuda. 
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In a previous article on Bonnington Castings8 the present author argued that, 
properly understood, the case provided no authority for any proposition that 
there was a ‘material contribution’ exception to the requirement to prove but-for 
causation.  In the author’s opinion, those arguments remain good and they will 
not be repeated here.  The only authority that did support such a position was 
Bailey, which had been recently decided.  The present article adds some further 
thoughts in relation to Bonnington and seeks to analyse the reception of Bailey 
and, ultimately, the decision in Williams. It argues that Bailey should no longer be 
regarded as binding authority on this point in the light of its treatment in 
Williams. 
The focus in this article is on the reasoning employed in the case law in England 
and Scotland. This accepts that the normal test for establishing factual causation 
in the law of negligence is the but-for test, but acknowledges that there are 
exceptions. Perhaps the best-known exception is that set out in Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd9 Whatever the rights and wrongs of that 
exception, the point made here is that it was adopted by the House of Lords 
deliberately and expressly as a matter of legal policy. It is submitted that the 
same is necessary wherever an exception to the normal rules is to be justified. 
There is of course a substantial literature arguing that the but-for test is 
inadequate as the core test for factual causation in determining liability in tort, 
particularly in a number of classes of case involving multiple sufficient causes.10 It 
                                           
8 S H Bailey, ‘Causation in negligence: what is a material contribution?’ (2010) 30 LS 
167. 
9 [[2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. Here the House of Lords held that it was just to 
make an exception to the normal rule in a case where the claimant developed 
mesothelioma as the result of exposure to asbestos dust but was unable to establish 
which of a number of employers who had wrongfully exposed him to such dust was 
responsible for the dust that actually triggered the condition.   
10 The difficult cases are those of overdetermination (for example where there are 
multiple causes of damage each of which alone is sufficient to cause it; or where a 
threshold needed to produce an effect is oversubscribed) and pre-emption, where one 
sufficient cause prevents another sufficient cause from  taking effect. See generally, 
Steel (n 3) Ch 1; Turton (n 3) Ch 2; J. Stapleton, ‘Unnecessary Causes’ (2013) 129 LQR 
39.     
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is argued that, for example in a negligence case, instead of speculating on what 
would have happened instead if the defendant had been careful (that is, on 
something that did not happen), the courts should focus on what did happen, 
employing some variation of the well-known NESS test, which asks whether the 
factor in question was a necessary element of a sufficient set to produce the 
effect.11 For some writers, a separate principle then provides that ‘even if a 
defendant’s breach was a cause of an injury, he is not liable to pay compensatory 
damages if the same injury would not have occurred in the absence of wrongful 
conduct’12 It is not the purpose of this article to address this debate. The 
introduction of a fundamentally different approach to establishing factual 
causation in the English law would need to be the subject of explicit argument 
before the courts. Such argument has not yet been deployed. Until then, it is 
appropriate to consider the case law in the terms in which it is being argued and 
decided. 
 
2. USAGES OF THE LANGUAGE OF ‘MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION’ 
The fullest consideration of the use of the language of ‘material contribution’ in 
the courts is by  Steel,13 who notes that the existing law on material contribution 
is deeply confused14 and distinguishes three different purposes for which that 
language (‘c materially contributed to e’) is used.  The first (termed in the present 
article as Variant 1) is where c is a but-for cause of e.  He says that ‘This usage is 
obfuscating.  It is clearer simply to say that c satisfies the but-for test’.  Secondly, 
                                           
11 The recent literature includes essays by Wright and Miller in R Goldberg (ed), 
Perspectives on Causation (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2011), Chs 
14, 15. Steel and Turton, (see n 3) argue for the adoption of forms of the NESS 
approach. Green (n 3) argues the case for a novel approach, which she terms ‘Necessary 
Breach Analysis’.    
12 J Stapleton, ‘An “Extended But-for” test for the Causal Relation in the Law of 
Obligations’ (2015) 35 OJLS 697, 713; Steel, (n 3) pp 42-43; J Stapleton ‘Unnecessary 
Causes’ (2013) 129 LQR 39, 54-61.         
13 Op cit n 3 p 240. See also Steel’s chapter in K Oliphant (ed), The Law of Tort (London: 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd edn, 2015) paras 14.12 ff. 
14 The same point is made by Turton (n 3), pp 65-73, writing of what she appears to 
regard as a single ‘material contribution’ rule.   
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(Variant 2),  there are ‘circumstances when some part of e would not have 
occurred without c, but it is difficult to determine how much of e would not have 
occurred without c’.  That is:  c has been a but-for cause of some part of a 
person’s total injuries, but that part is difficult to isolate.  In these circumstances, 
the courts have taken a liberal approach to assessing this part.  This could be 
called the ‘liberal extent of liability material contribution rule’. This is illustrated 
by Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd.15 Thirdly, (Variant 3), Steel suggests 
that there are also circumstances where ‘the defendant’s wrongful conduct 
actually played a physical role in the mechanism by which the claimant’s injury 
came about’ and c is found to be a cause of e event though the but-for test is not 
satisfied’16. This is illustrated by Bailey.17  Recent case law18 supports a fourth 
variant (in two forms) of ‘material contribution’. This is a proposition that, 
possibly in limited categories of case, where C can prove that D’s negligence was 
a but-for cause of part of C’s injury, C can recover damages for the whole of that 
injury either (1) in any event; or (2) unless D can establish a proper basis for 
apportionment. This different from Variant 2 as explained by Steel. If correct, this 
is clearly a but-for exception. It will be argued below that Variant 4(1) is 
unsound19 and that both Variants are inconsistent with Court of Appeal 
authority.20 
3. ’MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION’ IN THE CASE LAW PRIOR TO WILLIAMS 
 
Before proceeding to an analysis of Williams, it is necessary to make some 
observations on the case law reviewed in it, in particular, Bonnington and Bailey. 
 
                                           
15 [2000] ICR 1086. See nn 40-50. 
16 This involves a variant of the NESS test.  See n 11. 
17 n 4. Steel (n 3) pp 244-246 is highly critical of Bailey. See nn 66-68. 
18 See John, below nn 113-130. 
19 See nn 124-127. 
20 See nn 40-50, 128-130. 
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(a) What did Bonnington Castings decide? 
In Bonnington Castings,21 the pursuer, John Wardlaw, developed pneumoconiosis 
as the result of exposure to noxious dust at his place of work.  Much if not most 
of this dust was in the atmosphere other than as the result of any breach of duty 
by the defenders; however, some of the dust was there as the result of a breach 
of duty in failing properly to maintain dust extraction plant fitted to swing 
grinders. The disease was caused by the gradual accumulation in the lungs of 
minute particles of silica. The House of Lords held, reversing the Court of Session 
on this point, that the onus of proof of causation lay throughout on the pursuer.22  
They then had to determine whether the lower courts’ verdict for the pursuer 
could still stand, and decided unanimously that it should, on the basis that the 
tortious dust, although probably constituting a minority of the dust in the 
atmosphere, had made a material contribution to the disease.  What were the 
exact parameters of this holding as a matter of precedent has generated much 
debate.   
The present author remains of the view23 that the most natural interpretation of 
the holding is that the House of Lords regarded the combination of both sources 
of dust as necessary to cause the disease.  Lord Reid said that the disease was  
‘caused by the whole of the noxious material inhaled ….  It appears to me that the 
source of his disease was the dust from both sources.’24  This interpretation is 
supported by a further consideration, not mentioned in the previous article.  On 
the evidence in Bonnington, as set out in the pleadings and the printed case, Mr 
Wardlaw underwent x-ray examinations of his chest in 1948 and 1949 which 
showed no sign of pneumoconiosis.  He was further examined in April 1950, was 
told in May 1950 that he had pneumoconiosis and on medical advice he 
                                           
21 [1956] AC 613. See SH Bailey, op cit n 8; S Steel (op cit n 3) pp 222-224.   
22 See Lord Reid’s comment, above n 2.    
23 Expressed in op cit n 8. 
24 ie from hammers (non-tortious) and swing grinders (tortious). 
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immediately ceased work as a steel dresser.25  He said that ‘prior to May, 1950, 
when I was certified as suffering from silicosis, I hadn’t had any serious illness I 
had enjoyed good health’.26  The ‘tipping point’ at which there was a sufficient 
accumulation of dust to have the effects that led to a diagnosis of the disease had 
thus been reached in late 1949 or early 1950, shortly before he stopped work as 
a steel dresser.  It should also be noted that the award of damages upheld by the 
House took account of Mr Wardlaw’s permanent loss of earning capacity, the 
further development of the condition over two years following the initial diagnosis 
to a currently stable condition of moderate severity,27 and breathlessness and fits 
of coughing which would circumscribe his normal social life as well as his working 
activities.28   The interpretation of the case as involving a combination of 
separately insufficient causes is reinforced by Lord Keith’s comment:29 
 
 ‘Prima facie the particles inhaled are acting cumulatively, and I think the natural  
inference is that had it not been for the cumulative effect the pursuer would not 
have developed pneumoconiosis when he did and might not have developed it at 
all.’30 
 
Given the cumulative nature of the disease and the facts of the case the inference 
that had it not been for the cumulative effect of tortious and non-tortious dust Mr 
Wardlaw would not have developed pneumoconiosis when he did is irresistible.   
It is submitted that the ratio decidendi of the House of Lords decision on material 
contribution is that where a defendant’s wrongful contribution (above de minimis) 
is necessary to bring about damage, the defendant is liable in full for that 
                                           
25 Condescendence II; Pursuer’s Proof p 9.  The words ‘early pneumoconiosis’ appeared 
on a card dated 15 May 1950. 
26 Pursuer’s Proof p 23. 
27 This disease progresses even in the absence of further exposure to noxious dust. 
28 Lord Wheatley, 1955 SLT 225, 232. 
29 [1956] AC 613, 626. 
30 This can be explained as follows. The onset of the disease was caused by the 
combination of the tortious and non-tortious dust. Had the defendants complied with 
their statutory duty, only the non-tortious dust would have been present. Mr Wardlaw 
would have continued to work and would probably developed pneumoconiosis at a later 
date; there was also a possibility that he might never have developed the disease (the 
scenario Lord Keith had in mind here is not clear (Mr Wardlaw leaving his employment 
for other reasons?), but it does not seem relevant). 
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damage.  There was no problem of overdetermined causes or (material) 
evidential uncertainty31 to be solved and there were no arguments and no dicta 
addressed to either of those problems.32 
One of the reasons for the misinterpretation of Bonnington Castings is that it is 
commonly asserted that  
 
‘on the evidence the Claimant could not prove “but-for” causation, in the sense 
that it was more probable than not that if the dust extraction equipment had 
been working efficiently he would not have contracted the disease’.33 
 
This is nowhere stated as such in Bonnington Castings itself, and for the reasons 
given, is just not the case. It may be that it could not be said that he would never 
have contracted the disease, but that is not the same thing. Nevertheless, the 
fact that it seems to be widely believed to be true no doubt explains why some 
judges and commentators have come to characterise Bonnington Castings as an 
exception to but-for causation. This is commonly associated with the idea that a 
full award of damages had been made in a case where all C could show was that 
D’s negligence had caused part of the injury and that this therefore constituted a 
special ‘material contribution’ rule.34 This leads on to consideration of whether the 
damages in Bonnington should have been apportioned.     
                                           
31 There was evidential uncertainty in that the exact respective proportions of tortious 
and non-tortious dust could not be identified, but that is not material as the whole of the 
dust was regarded as the cause, and a more-than-de minimis contribution was sufficient.  
Whether there would have been sufficient evidence to make a rough-and-ready 
apportionment under Holtby (nn 40-50) is a matter of conjecture. 
32 By contrast, C Miller, ‘Causation in personal injury after (and before) Sienkiewicz’ 
(2012) 32 LS 396, 398-399 regards the Bonnington ‘material contribution’ principle as 
providing a solution to cases of overdetermination and for that reason is critical of the 
position taken in the 2010 article (n 8). It is submitted that this is an over-reading of the 
case. It is of course recognised that the but-for test does not produce a just outcome in 
some cases of overdetermination or pre-emption, certainly where there are multiple 
sufficient tortious causes. But these problems need to be addressed directly by analysis 
rather than by invocation of the expression ‘material contribution’; it will always be 
necessary to give reasons why a ‘contribution’ should be regarded as ‘material’ in such a 
case. English law already recognises a but-for exception where there are multiple 
sufficient tortious causes: Greenwich Millennium Village Ltd v Essex Services Group plc 
[2014] EWHC 1099 (TCC) (an issue not raised in the CA: [2014] EWCA Civ 960).  
33 This quotation is from Cox J in Mayne v Atlas Stone Co. [2016] EWHC 1030 (QB), para 
[18]. 
34 Variant 4, above n 18. 
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(c) Bonnington Castings and apportionment 
The starting point for considering apportionment is a statement by Green: 
‘It is trite negligence law that, where possible, defendants should only be held 
liable for that part of the claimant’s ultimate damage to which they can be 
causally linked….It is equally trite that, where a defendant has been found to 
have caused or contributed to an indivisible injury, she will be held fully liable for 
it, even though there may well have been other contributing causes.’35 
All turns on whether the injury is divisible. The fact that the causes of an 
indivisible injury can be distinguished, in a way that can rationally lead to an 
apportionment under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, does not itself 
establish that the injury is divisible.36 
No argument as to apportionment was deployed in Bonnington Castings. Here, it 
is important to note that there are a number of aspects of apportionment to 
consider.  
First, it might have been argued that the claim should only have been upheld 
insofar as the disease had been advanced by the tortious dust.37 This is a 
plausible argument on the facts but, as it was not raised, no significance can 
properly be attached to the point that a full award of damages was upheld. This 
aspect would be a clear example of a divisible injury. (Another would be a case 
where C’s claim against D is for the aggravation of an existing disease; D is only 
liable for the aggravation.38)  
                                           
35 Op cit n 3 p 97.  This passage was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Williams:  
see below n 93. 
36 This point has recently been strongly reinforced by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd v Konczak [2017] EWCA Civ 1188, where it was held 
that the EAT had been right to find that the claimant’s psychiatric illness was not 
divisible; per Underhill LJ at para [71]: ‘the exercise is not concerned with the divisibility 
of the causative contribution but with the divisibility of the harm’.  
37 See Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] ICR 613, para [42]. 
38 Ibid. 
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Secondly, it was not argued that pneumoconiosis was a divisible disease in a 
different sense that the damages, whether full damages or damages for the 
acceleration, should be reduced or further reduced to reflect (broadly) the 
proportion of tortious dust in the atmosphere. This is a distinct aspect from first 
one. 
It is submitted that apportionment on this basis would have been wrong in 
principle and is not supported by the well-known post-Bonnington authorities on 
apportionment in cumulatively-caused industrial disease cases. In these cases, 
apportionment was first applied in assessing damages to reflect the point that D’s 
conduct had only become tortious after a certain date.39 These were aggravation 
cases. More difficult to analyse is the decision in Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) 
Ltd  40 in upholding apportionment where different employers were responsible for 
wrongfully exposing the claimant to asbestos dust over different stages of the 
claimant’s career, leading to asbestosis. Here, one of the employers, which was 
responsible for about half of the exposure to asbestos, was sued. The evidence 
suggested that that exposure alone would have been sufficient to cause 
asbestosis; the exposures by the other employers led to the condition being more 
serious.41 The Court of Appeal expressly rejected arguments (1) that if C can 
prove that D’s conduct made a material contribution to C’s disease C is entitled to 
recover all their loss from D, notwithstanding that others may have contributed 
as well; and (2) that in such a case ‘the onus is upon the defendant to plead and 
prove that others were responsible for some and, if so, what part of the injury’.42 
The court held, further, that the trial judge had been entitled to make a 25% 
reduction in the damages on the basis that the C had proved causation in respect 
of a quantifiable part of his disability, and the judge was ‘counting the proportion 
                                           
39 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405; Allen v British 
Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] ICR 942. 
40 [2000] ICR 1086. 
41 Holtby, at para [7]. 
42 See  Holtby, at para [11] where the arguments are summarised. Clarke LJ dissented 
on the second point. 
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attributable to the defendant’. Indeed, the court would not have interfered with a 
50% reduction.43 Unfortunately, it does not appear from the report whether D’s 
exposures preceded or followed the other tortious exposures.44 If they followed 
them it would have been a straightforward aggravation case. If they preceded 
them, then it should have been explained why D was not liable (in addition to any 
subsequent tortfeasor) for the subsequent aggravation.45 However, these matters 
were not reached. D’s position on appeal, rejected by the court, was that no 
deduction at all should be made, not that a different deduction should have been 
made.46 It is submitted that the only possible aspect of these cases that supports 
divisibility by reference to cause rather than injury is the apparent view47 that D 
is liable in cumulative disease cases for the injury as it is at the end of 
employment with D but not for its subsequent aggravation, apart from any 
reliance on the law on remoteness of damage and intervening causes. As the 
point was not argued in the Court of Appeal in either Holtby or Allen the authority 
of these cases as a precedent is weak and, it is submitted, cannot stand with the 
approach of the Court of Appeal in Konczak.48 Accordingly, it is submitted that, in 
Bonnington, both the economic losses that flowed simply from the diagnosis of 
pneumoconiosis, which meant that Mr Wardlaw could no longer follow his skilled 
occupation, and the injury itself, as no question of aggravation arose and the 
argument as to advancement was not raised are properly to be regarded as 
indivisible. However, it has been accepted obiter (but without any analysis) that 
apportionment by reference to cause would have been appropriate in Bonnington 
                                           
43 Holtby at paras [23], [25]. 
44 Or indeed fell in between other tortious exposures or to any extent overlapped with 
them. 
45 It is unlikely that subsequent exposures would have been unforeseeable; it is difficult 
to see why they should amount to a new intervening cause. A reduction in damages on 
the basis that D was not liable for subsequent exposures was, however, expressly made 
by Smith J in Allen (n 39) but not challenged: see paras [4],[5]. 
46 Holtby, at para.[5]. 
47 Possibly arising on the facts of Holtby; an unchallenged finding of the trial judge in 
Allen 
48 n 36. 
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had the point been argued.49 It is submitted that acceptance of this view would 
mean that D would escape liability in respect of heads of damage of which D’s 
tort was a but-for cause and which were not too remote or the result of an 
intervening cause. It would be an exception to but-for causation made against the 
claimant’s interests.50 For the reasons already given, it is submitted that this view 
is unsound in principle. Furthermore, it has not been the subject of full argument 
in the case law to date.  
 
(d) What Bonnington did not address 
It should also be noted that there was no hint in any of the arguments or opinions 
in Bonnington that it might be sufficient to show merely that the defendant’s 
negligence or breach of statutory duty materially increased the risk of harm,51  or 
was a necessary element of a set of factors sufficient to cause the harm.52  
 
 (e)  What did Bailey v Ministry of Defence decide? 
The first decision53 to articulate the position that a (or the) ‘material contribution’ 
principle derived from Bonnington Castings operates as a but-for exception was 
that of the Court of Appeal in Bailey v Ministry of Defence.54 Here, the claimant 
underwent a gallstone operation at the defendant’s hospital. This was 
unsuccessful but it was not established to have been carelessly conducted.  She 
                                           
49 See eg Smith LJ in Ministry of Defence v AB [2010] EWCA Civ 1317, at [134]; Lord 
Bingham in Fairchild at para [14], where he referred to Bonnington as a case where the 
employer was ‘potentially liable for the balance’ (ie the tortious dust only). 
50 Cf the arguments that Bonnington involves an exception to but-for causation made in 
the claimants interests. 
51 The test subsequently adopted in McGhee v NCB [1973] 1 WLR 1, HL, expressly 
recognised as a but-for exception in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 
UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32, per Lord Bingham at paras [17]-[22].   
52 Cf above n 11.. Steel (n 3) pp 243, 244, states that only an ‘incautious’ reading of 
Bonnington would support such an interpretation, although such a reading had been 
adopted in Bailey (see nn 66-68). 
53 Prior to Bailey there were dicta in individual opinions that indicated, or stated in terms 
that Bonnington Castings stood for a special exception to the need to prove but-for 
causation.  See eg Lord Rodger in Fairhild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 
UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 at [129]. 
54 [2008] EWCA Civ 883, [2009] 1 WLR 1052. 
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became very seriously ill and was transferred to a second hospital.  Here, she 
aspirated her vomit and in consequence suffered cardiac arrest and severe brain 
damage.  She claimed that the incident was caused by a lack of care at the 
defendant’s hospital immediately after the operation, which had left her in a 
weakened state.  However, she had also developed pancreatitis after the 
operation, which was not claimed to be the result of a lack of care.  This would 
also have weakened her condition.  The medical evidence could not quantify the 
respective contribution of the lack of care and the pancreatitis to her weakened 
condition.  At first instance, Foskett J accepted an argument that a ‘material 
contribution’ would be sufficient to establish causation even though but-for 
causation could not be established. He went on to hold on the facts that the lack 
of care and the pancreatitis ‘each contributed materially to the overall weakness 
and it was the overall weakness that caused the aspiration’.55 It has previously 
been argued56 that this is in fact entirely consistent with a finding that but-for 
causation was established. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the defendants 
did not seek to argue that the totality of the weakness at the time of the 
aspiration was not necessary to cause it (ie that some lesser degree of weakness 
would or might have been sufficient); the defendants’ argument, rejected by the 
judge, was that the weakness resulting from lack of care was no longer operative 
at the time of the aspiration (ie not part of that totality). Waller LJ for the Court 
of Appeal held57 that Foskett J had been entitled to find on the facts that, while 
but-for causation had not been established, a material contribution (to the 
weakness) had. His Lordship held that in cases where a claimant relied on the 
argument that the defendant’s negligence had made a ‘material contribution’ to 
his or her harm, the but-for test was ‘modified’ (presumably disapplied). The key 
passage in Waller LJ’s judgment is this:58 
                                           
55 [2007] EWHC 2913 (QB), at para [61]. 
56 S H Bailey op cit n 8 pp 183-184. 
57 [2008] EWCA Civ 883 at [31]-[34], [36]. 
58 [2008] EWCA Civ 883, at [46]. 
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‘ In my view one cannot draw a distinction between medical negligence cases and 
others.  I would summarise the position in relation to cumulative cause cases as 
follows.  [Proposition A:]If the evidence demonstrates on a balance of 
probabilities that the injury would have occurred as a result of the non-tortious 
cause or causes in any event, the Claimant will have failed to establish that the 
tortious causes contributed. Hotson59 exemplifies such a situation. [Proposition 
B:]If the evidence demonstrates that “but for” the contribution of the tortious 
cause the injury would probably not have occurred, the Claimant will (obviously) 
have discharged the burden.[Proposition C:] In a case where medical science 
cannot establish the probability that “but for” an act of negligence the injury 
would not have happened but can establish that the contribution of the negligent 
cause was more than negligible, the “but for” test is modified, and the Claimant 
will succeed.’ 
 
The special Bailey rule appears as Proposition C.  
A number of comments can be made about this passage.  First, it is in terms 
designed to be applicable in any negligence case, not just medical negligence 
cases.  Secondly, it applies to ‘cumulative cause’ cases.  This category is not 
defined, but Waller LJ clearly regards it as applicable to cases involving 
cumulative causes of injury whether divisible or indivisible.  Bailey itself falls into 
the latter group. Propositions A and B are clearly orthodox.  
Proposition C is the crucial one. In terms, it applies where the evidential problem 
for the claimant arises from the limitations of ‘medical science’. Presumably, the 
reference to ‘medical’ relates to the context of Bailey itself. But why should 
evidential difficulties arising from the limitations of science be treated differently 
from other kinds of evidential difficulty?60 This question was not addressed. A 
further problem is that the expression ‘the contribution of the negligent cause 
was more than negligible’ is unclear. Does it mean that the negligent cause was 
shown on the balance of probabilities to be a but-for cause of part of the injury?61 
The problem here is that D’s negligence was a but-for cause of part of the 
weakness, but the ultimate injury, brain damage, was indivisible.  Accordingly, it 
presumably meant something broader. A final difficulty is that acceptance of 
                                           
59 ie Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority [1987] AC 750. Here, a doctor’s 
misdiagnosis was held not to have caused a disability which, by the time the patient was 
seen by the doctor, was probably going to happen anyway. 
60 Cf criticism of such a distinction by McLachlin CJ in Clements v Clements 2012 SCC 22, 
at para [38]. 
61 This would fall within Variant 4 of ‘material contribution’: see n 18. 
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Proposition C seems inconsistent with the rejection of similar arguments in 
Holtby,62 which was not cited.  
 
(f) Can the Bailey rule be derived from Bonnington Castings? 
It is submitted that Waller LJ’s Proposition C cannot properly be derived from 
Bonnington Castings.63  It is not supported by the ratio decidendi of that case; to 
say (as Waller LJ does64) that it was covered by Lord’s Reid’s statement that a 
causal link could be established by an above-de minimis material contribution 
assumes that Lord Reid (unlike Lord Keith) did not believe it necessary to 
establish but-for causation.  Given that, on the facts, such causation was 
established as regards the onset of the disease and no point was taken as to 
apportionment, this is simply implausible.  A further point of distinction is that 
Bonnington concerned cumulative causes of what is today regarded as a divisible 
injury,65 whereas Bailey concerned cumulative causes of a weakness that in turn 
caused an indivisible injury (brain damage). 
 
(h) Academic reaction to Bailey 
Academic commentary on the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Bailey has generally 
been critical.  It should be noted, however, that much of the analysis has been 
based on the entirely understandable assumption that, on the facts, (1) but-for 
causation was not established (given that that is what the Court of Appeal said) 
and (2) that it was uncertain how much weakness was necessary to cause the 
aspiration of vomit.  For Steel,66 the ‘intuitive notion of contribution’ applied here 
was the idea of a NESS cause and the imposition of liability in what was a case 
                                           
62 nn 40-50. 
63 Steel would seem to take a similar view:  op cit n 3 pp 245-246. 
64 [2008] EWCA Civ 883, at para [42]. 
65 But see nn 35-50 above. 
66 Op cit n 3 at pp 244-245. See also the case notes cited at Bailey op cit n 8 at n 84. 
Green, by a different route, also argues that no liability should have been found in 
Bailey:  op cit n 3 pp 107-109. 
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where it could not be proved that the defendant’s breach of duty made the 
claimant worse off, was ‘deeply radical’.  The effect was ‘to reverse the burden of 
proof on the issue of whether the injury would have happened anyway’.  Steel’s 
position is that exceptional rules under which the claimant is relieved of the 
requirement to prove that the relevant aspect of the defendant’s conduct was a 
cause of his or her injury on the balance of probabilities in order to obtain 
compensatory damages can only be properly justified where either D has in fact 
wrongfully caused injury to C or C has been the victim of an injury that would not 
have occurred without wrongful conduct.67  Simple uncertainty is not enough.68 
Turton69 notes that Bailey added to the confusion as to the content of ‘the 
material contribution rule’. In fact divisibility of damage was not clearly 
distinguished from the ‘divisibility’ of the exposure.70  On the assumption that but 
for causation could not be established, as the pancreatitis alone might have been 
sufficient to cause the brain damage, a causal link to the defendant’s wrong could 
nevertheless be established by reference to the NESS test.  However, it is not 
clear that she regards that as sufficient to support the award of damages. She 
argues71 that issues of quantification are distinct from issues of causation but 
does not address the issue of quantification in her discussion of Bailey.  
 
(i) The reception of Bailey in the case law 
                                           
67 Op cit n 3 pp 3-4, 5.   
68 Op cit n 3 pp 378-384.  See also, to similar effect, J Stapleton, ‘Unnecessary Causes’ 
(2013) 129 LQR 39, 50-54, 57-58. Stapleton (at p 50) interprets the facts as involving 
overdetermination; a threshold point of physical weakness had become oversubscribed 
before the vomit came on the scene (cf her comment at p 57 that ‘it may have been that 
the pancreatitis alone’ would have been sufficient).  However, the claimant could not 
show that the cardiac arrest represented ‘damage’, although the point had not been 
taken. 
69 Op cit n 3 pp 69-71, 74-75, 76-77. 
70 Stapleton ‘Unnecessary causes’ (2013) 129 LQR at 53 regards Bonnington and Bailey 
as ‘quite different’ for this reason. 
71 Op cit (n 3) pp 24-29. 
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Waller LJ’s dictum has been cited and considered in a large number of cases, 
mostly in the context of clinical negligence, but sometimes elsewhere.72  While 
counsel and the courts have generally accepted it uncritically as representing 
good law, in practice there has commonly been caution in its application. 
The cases fall into a number of groups.  First, are cases where the Bailey principle 
has been held not to apply as the medical evidence was clear,73 or no question of 
uncertainty in medical science arose.74  Second, there are cases where the court 
is satisfied that the injury would probably have occurred in any event from a non-
tortious cause.75  Third, there are cases where the court is satisfied that but-for 
                                           
72 See eg. Leigh v London Ambulance Service NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 286 (QB). Here, L 
was accidentally trapped between seats on a bus and suffered severe pain; an 
ambulance was called at 19.02 and should have arrived by 19.33 but there was a 
negligent delay until 19.50. L developed PTSD and claimed there was a sufficient 
causative link between the negligent delay and the PTSD. Globe J applied Bailey and held 
D liable (and awarded £0.5m) even though but-for causation could not be established. 
However, he also seemed to accept the opinion of the claimant’s expert that the PTSD 
developed ‘as a consequence of one indivisible event on the bus, as to which it was the 
whole time that was relevant’: paras [15], [18]. If so, this would make the case 
analogous to Williams and to Bailey as interpreted in Williams: see nn 93-105. 
73 Aspinall v Secretary of State for Health [2014] EWHC 1217 (QB) (injury would 
probably have happened anyway). 
74 Nyang v G4S Care and Justice Services Ltd [2013] EWHC 3946 (QB) (acts of  
negligence of staff responsible for at-risk detainee at immigration removal centre held 
not to have caused (self-inflicted) injuries to G; but-for test applied; Bailey not 
applicable as the present case was not based on ‘inadequacies in the state of medical 
science’ (para.[100]); while there had been negligence in a failure to carry out a 
sufficiently thorough mental health examination, there had not been time for the 
medication that should have been prescribed to take effect so as to prevent the 
incident); Baker v Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust [2015] 
EWHC 609 (QB) (no breach of duty in failure of psychiatrist to refer B to community 
mental health services; but-for test, not Bailey, applicable to determine whether such 
failure caused B’s suicide as limitations of medical science not relevant);  Chetwynd v 
Tunmore [2016] EWHC 156 (QB) [2016] EWHC 156 (QB) (material contribution 
approach in disease and clinical negligence cases not to be extended to claims in 
negligence or nuisance between adjacent landowners). The fact that Nyang and Baker 
were not cumulative cause cases was not relied on. 
75 Bailey Proposition A.  See Mugweni v NHS London [2012] EWCA Civ 20 (M’s brain 
damage probably the non-negligent consequence of operation rather than tension 
pneumothorax (PNT) (air collecting in pleural cavity) leading to cardiac arrest; not shown 
that the PNT and cardiac arrest itself (which was dealt with quickly) added to the 
damage therefore Bailey material contribution rule could not apply); King v Medical 
Services International Ltd [2012] (QB); Appleton v Medway NHS Foundation Trust 
[2013] EWHC 4776 (QB) (no liability where there was negligence in treating an infection 
but not shown that that infection played any part in making leg amputation necessary; 
this was wholly caused by M’s diabetes); ST v Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust 
[2015] EWHC 51 (QB); Owens v Medway NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 2363 
(QB), paras [122]–[123]. 
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causation is established.76  Fourth, there are cases where Bailey Proposition C has 
been accepted,77 although in most, only as a fall-back position where a finding of 
but-for causation has also been made.78 
Accordingly, it is only in a small number of High Court cases that Bailey 
Proposition C has been accepted as a valid basis for the award of damages where 
but-for causation cannot be established, and there seem to be very few indeed 
where it has been the basis of an actual award of damages.  One of the only 
cases (if not the only case) where this has happened is Canning-Kishver v 
Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust.79  Here, a neonate (born at 
25 weeks gestation) in intensive care was found at 8am to be very seriously 
unwell with a very low heart rate. She received life-saving measures and suffered 
brain injury.  Nursing staff were found to be negligent in failing properly to 
monitor and to call a doctor by, at the latest, 7am.  This would have prevented 
the need for drastic resuscitation.  It was claimed that the cardiac collapse and 
resuscitation measures caused or contributed to the brain injury.  The defendants 
contended that the injury flowed from risks inevitably associated with a neonate.  
The judge, Sir Christopher Holland, noted that research into the potential cause 
or causes of such injury in a neonate was ‘in its early days and ongoing’, the 
current issues being at the ‘cutting edge’.  The uncertainties as demonstrated by 
the medical evidence ‘militated against’ a finding of but-for causation, but that 
evidence was enough for a finding that the collapse made a contribution to the 
                                           
76 Bailey Proposition B.  See eg Ganz v Childs [2011] EWHC 13 (QB) (liability of GPs for 
negligent failure to refer patient to hospital); Lyndon v Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust 
[2011] EWHC 2904 (QB); Reaney v University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust 
[2014] EWHC 3016 (QB), para. [71]; Pringle v Nestor Prime [2014] EWHC 1308 (QB); 
Coakley v Rosie [2014] EWHC 1790 (QB). Gardner v Northampton General Hospital NHS 
Trust [2014] EWHC 286 (QB) can arguably be seen as such a case in that satisfaction of 
the but-for test was adopted as a fall-back position. 
77 Canning-Kishever v Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 
2384 (QB); Ingram v Williams [2010] EWHC 758 (QB), paras [80]–[87] (but no breach 
of duty found); Barnett v Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] 
EWHC 2627 (QB), (but no breach of duty found). 
78 Reaney; Coakley, para [118]; Pringle; Gardner; Hayes; Leigh. 
79 [2008] EWHC 2384 (QB). 
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brain injury.80  Even this case is not, however, unequivocal.  It is possible that 
had the judge needed to do so a finding of but-for causation might have been 
made.  This stands in contrast to the vast majority of cases in which judges do 
examine the detail of the evidence and find but-for causation established rather 
than the easier option of simply finding a material contribution on the basis of 
Bailey Proposition C.  This follows the order of analysis in Waller LJ’s dictum. 
However, there is also, perhaps, a judicial instinct that Bailey Proposition C is 
unorthodox and possibly unsound, and should only be reached after a view is 
taken on the orthodox approach. This survey suggests that Bailey Proposition C 
has rarely, if ever, been determinative. The extent to which this has in practice 
added substantive burdens to defendants in settling cases is not known.  
However, it clearly adds to the cost of litigating cases as the expert evidence has 
to address both causation theories. 
 
4. THE DECISION IN WILLIAMS v THE BERMUDA HOSPITALS BOARD 
 
(a) The facts 
In Williams v The Bermuda Hospitals Board,81  the claimant was admitted to an 
emergency department with abdominal pains at 11.17 am.  At 12.10 the 
emergency doctor decided to order a scan, but the actual request was not sent off 
until 13.10.  The doctor should have asked for an immediate scan but negligently 
did not do so.  The scan was performed at 17.27 and the report received at 
19.30.  Acute appendicitis was diagnosed and the claimant was operated on at 
around 21.30.  It was discovered that in the meantime the appendix had ruptured 
and the claimant had developed serious sepsis.  The sepsis caused complications 
ie injury to the heart and lungs.  The trial judge, Hellman J,82 found that, had the 
                                           
80 Para [37]. 
81 [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888. 
82 [2013] SC (Bda) 1 Civ 
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scan been asked for on an immediate basis, the operation would have taken place 
between 4 hrs 40 mins and 2 hrs 20 minsearlier than it did.  There had 
accordingly been a period of non-negligent delay  followed by a period of 
negligent delay.  The process of rupture and therefore the sepsis had started to 
develop from 15.19, which was before commencement of the period of negligent 
delay, and had got progressively worse with the passage of time.  The judge 
concluded that, even if there had been a system in place for quick diagnosis, it 
was not established that the claimant would have been operated on before the 
rupture of his appendix. Accordingly, the claimant had not proved that the 
negligent delay caused the complications. However, the judge did award $2,000 
damages for the additional pain and suffering caused by the negligent delay.  The 
Court of Appeal83 allowed an appeal on the ground that, relying on Bailey, the 
correct test was whether the negligent delay had made a material contribution to 
the complications. This did not involve satisfaction of the but-for test and was 
clearly satisfied on the facts. The case was remitted for damages to be 
reassessed, leading to a total award of $6o,000. Permission to appeal to the Privy 
Council was also granted. 
 
(b) The arguments 
What arguments were presented to the Privy Council?84  Counsel for the 
appellants (the defendants)85 argued that orthodox rules required (1) satisfaction 
of the but-for test; or (2) proof that the breach materially contributed to the 
injury (Bonnington Castings). On either basis, a claimant had to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that the breach had caused them harm.  There were two 
constructions of ‘any rule of causation established by Bonnington’.  The first, 
narrow, construction would confine it to factual circumstances directly parallel to 
                                           
83 [2013] CA (Bda) 2 Civ, (2014) 84 WIR 155. 
84 See [2016] AC 888, 891-897; a podcast of the oral arguments was available on the 
Privy Council website. 
85 Caroline Harrison QC, who appeared with Andrew Bershadski. 
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those in that case, ie exposure to dust from innocent and guilty sources 
concurrently, causing divisible disease.  The second, broader, construction, 
adopted in innumerable cases, was that the claimant could recover damages for 
personal injury under this rule only where it was shown that (1) on the balance of 
probabilities, the breach of duty made a more than negligible contribution to the 
actual injury; (2) the negligent and non-negligent contributions were concurrent; 
(3) there was a single causative agent; and (4) there was a dose related 
relationship between the causative agents and the harm.86  The injury and not 
merely the mechanism that led to the injury had to be divisible.  Bonnington 
provided no support for a claimant recovering damages where there was 
evidential uncertainty and all that could be shown that careless conduct may have 
had a role in the outcome. Proving that the breach caused an increase in risk was 
insufficient unless the Fairchild exception applied and it clearly did not here.87 
Bailey was a departure from the ambit of any rule of causation contained in 
Bonnington. On the facts, the claimant could only prove that he had been caused 
two hours’ unnecessary pain and suffering.88    
Counsel for the respondent (the claimant)89 argued on the facts that either (1) 
there was sufficient evidence to establish but-for causation; or (2) it was a case 
where it was obvious that a ‘robust, and context-sensitive approach’ to but-for 
causation should be employed. Alternatively, the Court of Appeal in Bermuda had 
been correct to conclude that the plaintiff had proved a material contribution to 
his injury.90  Here, counsel interpreted Bonnington as a rule about proof: an 
                                           
86 This is put forward as different from satisfying the but-for test but, given the reference 
to the injury being divisible, it is difficult to see how this is so.   
87 The claimants did not rely on Fairchild. 
88 In the oral submissions it was said that nobody knew how much sepsis was needed to 
cause the injury. This point is not adverted to by the Privy Council. 
89 Benjamin Browne QC, appearing with Luka Krsljanin. 
90 Lord Toulson at para [24] noted Mr Browne’s argument that the Court of Appeal had 
been entitled to conclude that the overall time allowed by the judge had been too long; 
surgery ought to have commenced by 17.15 or at the latest 18.10. (On either basis, the 
period of non-negligent delay after 15.19 through which sepsis had been developing 
would have been shorter than the period of negligent delay). On these facts ‘the Court of 
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inference of ‘material contribution’ could be drawn where it was shown that (1) 
the claimant had been exposed to a specific risk factor91 known to be associated 
with the type of damage which eventuated; (2) D’s negligence increased that 
specific risk factor; (3) the causative agents to which the claimant was exposed 
operated cumulatively; and (4) there is, however, scientific uncertainty such as to 
make it scientifically impossible for the issue of causation to be resolved on a 
strict ‘but-for’ basis.  ‘The doctrine of material contribution rests on appropriately 
made inferences: it operates precisely where scientific evidence is so limited that 
the rigid “but-for” test cannot be applied.’ The defendant’s contention that 
scientific evidence must prove a contribution to the injury was overly restrictive. 
Furthermore, it was sufficient for the application of this approach that the causes 
were concurrent in effect; they did not have to be temporally concurrent.  It 
would apply whether the injury was divisible or indivisible.  This would ‘not 
amount to any relaxation of the law on causation’.92 
(c) The decision 
The Privy Council (through Lord Toulson) held that the hospital was liable, 
applying Bonnington Castings.  Bonnington was to be interpreted as holding that 
the disease was caused by the totality of the toxic material inhaled and that 
therefore, as the question of divisibility was not raised,the tortious dust was a 
partial cause of the entire injury not merely a cause of part of the injury.93 It had 
not been suggested in Bonnington itself that pneumoconiosis was a divisible 
                                           
Appeal were entitled to infer that the greatly extended period for the development of 
sepsis materially contributed to the outcome.’  
91 Rather than a ‘single causative agent’ though it seems to require a single ‘factor’. 
92 It will be noted that this provides a further version (Variant 5) of ‘the material 
contribution rule’, namely that, provided the preconditions are fulfilled, the court may 
draw an inference of material contribution on the facts even though science in itself 
cannot go that far.  However, while it says when an inference of ‘material contribution’ 
can be drawn, it leaves the nature of that contribution (is it a but-for contribution?) 
obscure.  The final comment suggests that it is.  Counsel did not place major reliance on 
Bailey. 
93 See paras [31]–[34]. At para [31], Lord Toulson cited Green’s observations set out 
above at n 35. 
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injury. Bonnington was regarded as an ‘obvious parallel’ to the facts of Williams.94 
Here, the judge found that the injury to the heart and lungs was caused by a 
single known agent, sepsis from the ruptured appendix.95 The sepsis developed 
incrementally. It was not divided into separate components causing separate 
damage to the heart and lungs, but was a single continuous process that lasted 
longer than it should. Accordingly,96 on the basis of the trial judge’s findings that 
there had been a period of negligent delay of at least 2hs 20mins,97 it was ‘right 
to infer on the balance of probabilities that the hospital board’s negligence 
materially contributed to the process [ie the sepsis] and therefore materially 
contributed to the injury to the heart and lungs’.  It did not matter that in 
Bonnington the relevant exposures were simultaneous whereas here the delays 
were sequential; drawing such a distinction was not practicable.  
What  of Bailey?  Lord Toulson98 noted the analysis of Foskett J in Bailey, namely 
that both the weakness engendered by negligence and the weakness engendered 
by pancreatitis ‘contributed materially to the overall weakness and it was the 
overall weakness that caused the aspiration.’ On those findings of primary fact, 
Foskett J was right to hold the hospital liable. Lord Toulson added: 
‘As to the parallel weakness of the claimant due to her pancreatitis, the case may 
be seen as an example of the well known principle that a tortfeasor takes his 
victim as he finds her.  The Board does not share the view of the Court of Appeal 
that the case involved a departure from the “but-for test”. The judge concluded 
that the totality of the claimant’s weakened condition caused the harm. If so, 
“but-for” causation was established. The fact that her vulnerability was 
                                           
94 Para [35]. 
95 Para [41]. 
96 Para [42]. 
97 Lord Toulson at para [43] found it unnecessary to resolve the factual dispute about 
the length of the period of culpable delay. 
98 Paras [46]-[47]. This was obiter, given that liability was found established without any 
need to rely on Bailey Proposition C. 
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heightened by her pancreatitis no more assisted the hospital’s case than if she 
had an egg shell skull.’  
Three comments can be made about this passage. First, it is an indication that on 
the primary facts found, it was appropriate to draw an inference from those facts 
that but-for causation was established. This is not a wholly surprising conclusion. 
All it needs is a finding that the weakness from the pancreatitis alone was 
probably not sufficient to cause the aspiration and that at least some of the 
tortiously caused weakness was needed as well. Given that the aspiration took 
place on a particular day when both sources of weakness were found to be 
operative, such a finding does not seem especially ‘robust’. Secondly, as has been 
recognised by commentators,99 it is difficult to see how the thin skull rule, a 
principle that concerns remoteness of damage, has any relevance to establishing 
causation in fact. It is submitted that the reasoning in the previous comment 
provides a sufficient explanation of the position and does not rely on the thin skull 
rule. On Foskett J’s approach, the facts of Bailey aresimilar to the facts of 
Williams.  Accordingly, Lord Toulson’s treatment of Bailey reinforces the argument 
that the decision in Williams itself involves an application of the but-for 
test.Thirdly, it is not clear whether the Privy Council is to be taken as having 
disapproved Waller LJ’s Proposition C or was merely saying that it was an obiter 
dictum. 
 
(d) Discussion 
Lord Toulson did not expressly say in terms that the Privy Council was, or was 
not, applying the but-for test. There are indications both ways. On the one hand, 
given the reliance on the analogy with Bonnington as now analysed, it can be 
                                           
99 eg D Nolan and K Oliphant, Lunney, Nolan and Oliphant, Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 6th 
edn, 2017) p 234. Steel and Stapleton, ‘Causes and Contributions’ (2016) 132 LQR 363, 
p 367, state that a similar principle can operate in the factual causation context, but that 
reference to the remoteness principle in the factual causation context ‘may well muddy 
the waters’.  
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read as saying that on these facts the complications were caused by the totality 
of the sepsis, and that that was an indivisible cause of the harm. This carries the 
implication that the Privy Council was prepared to infer from the primary facts 
that the sepsis that resulted from the period of non-negligent delay was not alone 
sufficient to cause the complications.100 Indeed, the Privy Council seems to regard 
the full awards of damages on the facts of Bonnington,101 Bailey and Williams as 
involving the application of ‘trite law’ in that in each case it was to be inferred 
that the defendant’s negligence was a part cause of an indivisible injury. It 
inevitably follows that this approach will be applicable whether the causes are 
concurrent or successive.102  This would be consistent with Version 1 of ‘material 
contribution’.103 
On the other hand, if that was the position, why express it in the language of a 
‘material contribution to a material contribution’? This has left open the possible 
interpretation that the privy Council was adopting Version 3 of ‘material 
contribution’.104 Ultimately, there are two possibilities. One is that the Privy 
Council was simply applying ‘trite law’ and drawing an inference, possibly 
‘robustly and pragmatically’,105 that but-for causation was established. This seems 
the more plausible interpretation. If that is not the case, then the analysis is 
                                           
100 Steel and Stapleton (n 99), p 366, assert that in Bailey ‘it had not been established 
on the balance of probabilities that, absent [the negligent] contribution to her weakened 
state, she would have been able to deal with her vomit’. It is submitted that Lord 
Toulson simply took a different view on this point.  Nolan and Oliphant (n 99), p 235, 
state that Williams cannot properly be interpreted as involving an application of the but-
for test as the trial judge had refused to make such a finding. It is submitted, with 
respect, that this seems to overlook the point that an appellate court on an appeal is 
entitled to draw different inferences from the primary facts from those drawn by the trial 
judge:  Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ld [1955] A.C. 370 per Lord Reid at pp 375-376. 
101 Bonnington was to be treated as an indivisible injury case as the divisibility point was 
not raised: see Lord Toulson at para [32]. It has been submitted above (nn 35-50) that 
it is properly to be regarded as a case of indivisible injury apart from the question 
whether damages should only have been awarded for the advancement of the disease.  
102 Reliance on this distinction by counsel for the defendants rested on the assumption 
that Bonnington was a special exceptional rule applicable where the but-for test was not 
satisfied. 
103 See n 13. 
104 See n 17. 
105 The ‘special conditions’ mentioned by Benjamin Browne QC were not referred to and 
cannot be taken to have been either endorsed or rejected. 
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unfortunately opaque. Whichever position is right, it does not provide clear 
support for the existence of any exceptions to proving but-for causation. 
 
 
5.  HOW HAS WILLIAMS BEEN RECEIVED?  
(a) Academic and professional commentary 
Academic and professional commentary on Williams has seen a wide range of 
responses, which may be summarised as follows: 
(1)  the decision is orthodox, involving application of the but-for test;106 
(2)  the decision is wrong, involving the improper application of ‘material 
contribution’ without involving establishment of but-for causation; the claim 
should have been rejected for failure to establish but-for causation; this is 
‘potentially disastrous for medical practitioners, their insurers and the NHS’;’107  
(3) the decision is right, is based on application of Bonnington, involves 
modification of but-for causation, and the Privy Council rightly ‘declined the 
invitation to turn back a decade of progress for patients’ rights and safety’;108 
(4) the decision applied a version of ‘material contribution’ that appears to 
refer to ‘a contribution to (ie a cause that affects , usually by worsening) a 
condition or state of affairs that does cause the damage complained of;’109 
(5) the decision should have involved application of a principle that, where D 
wrongfully contributes to a process by which an indivisible injury occurs, 
                                           
106 C  Foster, ‘A material contribution to forensic clarity’ (2016) 166 NLJ 7689: ‘”material 
contribution” is just one way of expressing true, “but-for” causation in certain sets of 
factual circumstances” (p 10).  Cf M White, (2016) PILJ 11 (Williams approves Bailey but 
Bailey is based on but-for causation). 
107 S Green, [2016] PN 169. 
108 M Lyons, [2016] JPIL C75.  The claims of ‘progress’ for patients is not borne out by 
the decided cases (see nn 78-86). Also welcoming is C Hobson, ‘Williams v The Bermuda 
Hospitals Board: pro-patient, but for ambiguities which remain’ (2017) 25 Medical Law 
Review 126. 
109 J Plunkett, ‘Causation in asbestos-related lung cancer claims’ (2016), PN 158  p 162. 
This echoes Variant 3 of ‘material contribution’: n 17. Nolan and Oliphant (n 99) pp 234-
235, state that a principle along these lines seems to be the best way of explaining the 
results in Bailey and Williams, but that it is difficult to discern such a principle from the 
reasoning in them.  
27 
 
causation in fact is established, but ‘compensatory damages are not awarded if 
they would make the claimant better off than the claimant would have been 
absent wrongful conduct’.110  
The argument in this paper is that, notwithstanding the difficulties in the 
reasoning, the significance of the decision in Williams should be taken at face 
value as involving an inference of fact that but-for causation was established; it 
only purports to apply what it regards as ‘trite law’.  The author shares the 
concerns inherent in (1), (2), (4) and (5) above that to award full damages in 
cases where but-for causation cannot be established needs proper justification 
and disagrees with the views in (2) and (3) that that is what Williams does as a 
matter of law. The question whether there is a ‘material contribution’ exception to 
proving but-for causation is crying out for review afresh by the Supreme Court. 
The accumulated dicta to date are unclear, inconsistent and unhelpful and 
proceed largely by assertion. Clarity is needed on the exact parameters of such 
an exception and on what are the reasons of legal policy that justify it.   
 
 (b) Post-Williams cases 
Williams has been cited in a few cases, of which two ar significant. 
Heneghan 
 In Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd,111 H died from lung cancer caused by 
asbestos dust Two points are of interest for our purposes.  First, the court 
rejected on the facts an argument that each individual exposure to asbestos dust 
made a material contribution to the development of lung cancer.  They confirmed 
that the development of cancer was not like the development of a cumulative 
disease such as pneumoconiosis or asbestosis.  It was not legitimate to infer from 
epidemiological evidence that demonstrated that cumulative exposures increased 
                                           
110 J.Stapleton and S.Steel ‘Causes and contributions’ (2016) 132 LQR 363. Accordingly, 
the award of damages in Williams was only supportable if but-for causation had been 
established.  
111 [2016] EWCA Civ 86. 
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the risk of harm that each exposure played a part in bringing that harm about.  
The second point is this.  Lord Dyson MR112 said there were three ways of 
establishing causation in disease cases:  (1) satisfying the but-for test; (2) ‘when 
the disease is caused by the cumulative effect of an agency part of which is 
attributable to breach of duty on the part of the defendant and part of which 
involves no breach of duty, the defendant will be liable on the ground that his 
breach of duty made a “material contribution” to the disease:  Bonnington 
Castings’; (3) the Fairchild exception.  It is submitted that the wording of 
proposition (2) is actually consistent with the but-for test rather than inconsistent 
with it, even though it is presented separately. Furthermore, it is helpful in 
discouraging the notion that the ‘material contribution’ concept might be invoked 
without proper analysis to solve causation difficulties in disease cases outside the 
context of cumulative causes. 
John 
John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust113 addressed issues arising from Williams directly. 
The claimant, Dr Sido John, sought damages in respect of brain damage.  There 
were three factors that led to this damage:  (1) the effect of a fall; (2) negligent 
delay in transfer to a specialist hospital which caused ‘an extended period of 
raised inter-cranial pressure’; and (3) a post-operative infection that was not te 
result of negligence.   The claimants in argument accepted that ‘the expert 
medical analysis did not permit a “but-for” assessment to be made’.114 (This must 
mean that it was accepted that it was equally possible that the non-tortious 
causes had been sufficient alone to cause the brain damage.) However, they 
argued that Dr John was entitled to full compensation, relying on Bailey and 
Williams. The defendants in argument accepted that their negligence had made a 
                                           
112 At para [23]. 
113 [2016] EWHC 407 (QB). 
114 Para [82]. 
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material contribution to the injury115 and that that was sufficient for liability,116 
but argued that damages should be apportioned to reflect the extent of that 
contribution by comparison with the effect of the two non-tortious causes. Picken 
J held: (1) that there is a special ‘material contribution’ test to be derived from 
Bonnington; (2) that this was not confined to cases where there was a single 
agency (eg the dust in Bonnington; the overall weakness in Bailey; and the 
overall sepsis in Williams) but applied where there were different agents (here, 
the initial injury, the pressure and the post-operative infection); (3) that damages 
should not be apportioned in accordance with Holtby: first, it was doubtful 
whether apportionment was permitted where causation was established;117 
secondly, it was impossible and not merely difficult (as in Holtby) to find a proper 
basis for apportionment; and ‘if the evidence is such that it is not possible to 
attribute damage to a particular cause, the claimant must be entitled to recover 
in respect of the entirety of his or her loss.’118  
This case takes the law beyond Bonnington and Williams and must therefore 
stand on its own authority. It asserts that there is  a special rule. Point (2) was 
based first on the argument that Lord Reid in Bonnington Castings had regarded 
the material contribution principle as of general application.  So he did, but for 
the reasons given above119 it is unsafe to assume that his reference to this term 
is to be equated with any special ‘material contribution rule’; and no such special 
rule was in terms endorsed by Williams.  A second reason was that Lord Bridge in 
Wilsher120 (the source of the single causative agent principle as it limits Fairchild) 
had made it clear that that the outcome would have been different if the claimant 
                                           
115 See paras [89],[92]. Counsel for the defendants seemed  to accept that the tortious 
inter-cranial pressure had caused some brain damage. 
116 It is submitted that this concession should not have been made, given the weakness 
of the authority to justify this position although it is consistent with the dictum in 
Heneghan cited above. 
117 Version 4(1) of ‘material contribution’:see n 21. 
118 Para [98]. Version 4(2) of ‘material contribution’: see n 21. 
119 nn 8, 21-31. 
120 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074, HL. 
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could have shown that the excess of oxygen had made a ‘material contribution’ to 
the blindness.121  This is a fair point. But it is undermined by the point that it is 
unclear whether Lord Bridge regarded ‘material contribution’ as a but-for 
exception. All it really shows is that Wilsher does not as a matter of precedent 
require the application of the single causal agent rule in a material contribution 
case.  It needs to be addressed as a matter of legal policy whether the ‘single 
causal agent’ rule should be applied to any special ‘material contribution’ rule (as 
a but-for exception) in cumulative cause cases as it does in Fairchild.  An 
argument that it should is that any special claimant-friendly principle should be 
drawn as narrowly as possible.  An argument against is that the claimant in such 
a case will have proved D to have caused some damage to him or her, justifying 
invocation of a special rule,122 and that restriction to cases on single causal agent 
is to draw an arbitrary and unworkable line. For example, what counts as a 
‘single’ causal agent may well depend on the generality of language used to 
describe causes, an inherently uncertain process.123  
As to point (3) in John it was simply asserted124 that apportionment (sc by cause) 
was not available in a ‘material contribution to damage’ case. This is undeniably 
true where D’s wrong (‘material contribution’ is a but-for cause of such an 
injury.125 But Barker v Corus UK Ltd126 remains good law for the principle that 
there should generally be apportionment where the material increase in risk but-
for exception is applied.127 Why this should not be applied where a different but-
for exception is applied needs to be justified, not merely asserted. A yet further 
problem is that Holtby128 stands for the proposition that, where apportionment is 
                                           
121 Picken J cited Lord Bridge in Wilsher at pp 1081-1082.   
122 See further n 133.  
123 For powerful criticism of the ‘single agent’ rule as it applies in Fairchild cases see K 
Wellington, ‘Beyond single causative agents’ (2013) 20 Torts LJ 208. 
124 Para [98]. 
125 Cf n 51. 
126 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572. 
127 The Compensation Act 2006 s.3 reverses Barker only in cases of mesothelioma: 
Heneghan. 
128 nn 40-50.. 
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appropriate, the risk of evidential uncertainty lies with the claimant. That follows 
from the points that the majority in that case required the claimant to prove ‘that 
the defendant is responsible for the whole or a quantifiable part of his disability’ 
and declined to place any legal or evidential burden on the defendant129 In John, 
it was said that the court in Holtby was merely dealing with cases of evidential 
difficulty not impossibility.130 It is difficult to see that that is an adequate basis for 
distinguishing Holtby. and indeed the outcome seems plainly inconsistent.Overall, 
John further illustrates the problem that the assumption that Bonnington 
establishes a special rule gets in the way of full debate of the relevant issues of 
legal policy. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the light of Williams and the cases following it, it is possible to set out the 
following propositions. 
(1) The expression ‘material contribution’ continues to be associated with a 
number of distinct ideas.131 It is,unhelpful to assume that there is a single 
‘material contribution rule’. Counsel and judges invoking ’material contribution’ 
need to be clear which meaning is relied upon. 
(2) The normal rule remains the but-for test. A ‘material contribution’ will 
commonly amount to a but-for cause. Examples include cases where a judge finds 
(robustly or otherwise) that the totality132 of a number of factors (‘material 
contributions’) operating cumulatively is necessary to cause a disease 
Bonnington, Bailey and Williams can be regarded as such cases..  
                                           
129 per Stuart-Smith LJ at para [20]. 
130 Picken J at paras [99]-[100]. 
131 Six distinct variants have been identified: see nn 13, 16,18,92. 
132 This is not of course necessary; it is enough that the judge is satisfied that the non-
tortious factors are not sufficient alone to cause the damage. 
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(3) There is some support in the case law for a special ‘material contribution’ rule 
in cumulative cause cases that addresses some situations where there is 
evidential uncertainty: where C can show that D’s wrong has been a but-for cause 
of some damage to C, then the risk of uncertainty as to the extent of that 
damage lies with D.133 The view of the majority in Holtby on this point would need 
to be revisited. It will be necessary to pay close attention to the parameters of 
any such rule. So far, there are authorities that, on the one hand, deny a 
requirement that there be a single causal agent;134 and, on the other, deny (by 
assertion) that any special rule applies to claims in negligence or nuisance 
between landowners.135 A real problem with the rule is that it would appear give 
rise to the position that full damages would be awarded in a case where the 
evidence is not sufficiently precise to justify an apportionment, but it is 
reasonably clear that D’s tortious contribution is relatively small. This is hard to 
justify, and does incentivise apportionment where at all possible.  
(4) In any event, the existence or parameters of any special ‘material 
contribution’ rule needs to be considered afresh at the level of the appellate 
courts.  
(5) Bonnington Castings and Bailey are to be regarded, on Lord Toulson’s 
approach in Williams, as cases where but-for causation was established, in which 
case they are notoverdetermination cases and are not safely to be cited on such 
matters. Bailey Proposition C is at best an obiter dictum. It may be that Version 3 
of ‘material contribution’136 could be developed to address such cases. Whether 
that is the best approach is a separate matter and remains for another day. 
 
 
                                           
133 This is the position adopted by Clarke LJ(dissenting) in Holtby (n 40) paras [34]-[37] 
and Picken J in John. It is supported by Green (n 3), pp 95-96)but not Steel (n 3), pp 
244-246). 
134 John. 
135 Chetwynd: n 74. 
136 n 16. 
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